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IN THE SUPREME
COURT
.
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of /
EM~IA

G. BUTfARS,
Deceased.

(
J

Case No. 1945
Proponent and
Respondent's Brief

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Trial
Court entered on November 15, 1952, admitting the Will
of Emma G. Buttars, to probate, nothwithstanding the
verdict of the Jury. The jury return~d its special verict
on November 5, 1952, in which it found that the said will
was not procured by undue influence or fraud, but found
that on the date said will was executed on March 22, 1945, .
she was not of a sound and disposing mind.
The trial court no doubt based its judgment upon the
undisputed evidence, as testified by both the attending
witnesses, that Emma G. Buttars, unas.sisted, directed how
she wanted her will made and the lack of any evidence of
insanity. Both attesting witnesses testified that in their
opinion Emma G. Buttars, on the date she made her will
was mentally competent and had testamentary capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Whenever reference is made herein to the pleadings,
judgment or the testimony, it will be the record number
made at bottom of each page by the court clerk. The
3
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facts as detailed on pages 2 and 3 of appellants brief
are in the main correctly stated, except we submit that
their is no evidence that Wallace Buttars, who is named
as executor in the will, took advantage of his mother.
Counsel states (Br. 3) that decedent kept her holdings
intact until conveyance and transfers commencing six
days after will was made. These deeds did not necessarily
affect her holdings since she retained a life estate, and
therefore, enjoyed the income from the property until her
demise. (Con. Ex. 21, 23, 24. ) And this income is reflected in her bank accounts. (R. 137.) And moreover,
she retained title to most of her real property and also the
bank accounts as appears from petition to probate will.
( R. 1-4.) Counsel states ( Br. 3) that prior to date of will,
Mrs. Buttars wanted to treat all of the children equally.
This no doubt explains why she gave his children, each
one dollar, because as she stated in the will, Dan had failed
to repay his loan, evidenced by ( Exs. 2 and 3.)
We cannot agree with statement of facts as related
on pages 4 and 5 of appellanfs brief. These statements
are at variance with the testimony of disinterested witnesses. From an examination of the will it is interesting
to note that testatrix could and did remember the death
of her son, Dan, and could and did remember the names
of his children because she accurately detailed them to
Atttd"ney Daines. ( R. 5, 42) and she had no one to assist
her memory, ( R. 38, 39) nor did she have a written memorandum to assist her. ( R. 41.) She recited in her will
that her son "Daniel D. Buttars" was deceased ( R. 5) and
noted the difference in his name (middle initial) with that
of her deceased husband, Daniel Buttars.
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Her n1ind was not confused, nor was her mind or
body deteriorated to the extent, that she was incompetent
to make a will. The testimony of both attesting witnesses
is that Mrs. Buttars, unassisted, supplied the information
from which the will was prepared. ( R. 37-39.) She also
had the note and mortgage (Con. Exs. 2 and 3) with her
at the time and, left said documents and the will with
Mr. Daines for safe keeping, and he retained them continuously until after her demise. ( R. 46, 335. )
There is an apparent error in the Reporter's transcript
(~. 204, line 8) in the use of the word "incompetent," or
m: the use of the same word by the cross examiner - and
this is cleared up ( R. 205) where the witness, Melvin
Buttars, admitted that he had signed a petition to probate
the will (Pro. Ex. B) on the grounds that his mother,
Emma G. Buttars, was mentally competent to make the
will, Pro. Ex. t;t;A") ( R. 205. )
The apparent confusion on question of ~e ownership
of turkeys (Br. 5) is in the ~ind of the witness Melvin H.
Buttars, and not in the mind of the testatrix ( R. 201) for
here the witness expresses only his own opinion as to the
nature of the ownership. Mter all, Wallace was a tenant
on her land. Counsel cites the testimony of Maybell
Griffiths, as authority for the fact that testatrix did not
know what property she possessed ( Br. 5.) · This witness
testified that the time she was referring to was when Mrs.
Buttars was sick in 1944 ( R. 237) and in 1952, but nothing
is said about 1945, when the will was made. And moreover,. this was another of the witnesses who signed and
authorized a petition to admit the same will to probate,
but asked the court to appoint her brother Melvin as ad-
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ministrator with will annexed, and she testified, {referring
to said petition (Proponent's Exhibit No. B) - "Q. And
on the day you signed this, about the 23rd day of July,
1952, you asked the court to probate this will as the last
will and testament of your mother? A. Yes. Q. In which
it states she's of sound and disposing mind and memory.
That's the petition you signed, was it not? A. It looks
like it. ( R. 253) ." And notwithstanding, the contestants
attempted to discredit their mother and grandmother for
as long as twelve years before her death, ~11 of the testimony of the disinterested witnesses produced by proponents, is to the effect that to and including March, 1951,
she was physically able to care for herself, and her mind
was alert for a woman of her age. ( 266-330.) Dr. Randall,
her attending physician testified that her mind was sound
until March of 1952. ( R. 294-296. )
Wallace Buttars, testified that he had no knowledge
of provisions of the will and that he took no part in the
making of the same. On page 393 of the record Wallace
testified - "Q. I'll ask you whether or not you had anything to do with the making of the will, or suggesting, or
anything at all to do with it. A. I never did." And he
also testified - Q. Did you have anything to do or did
you accompany your mother at any time when she went
into the First Security Bank and bought those bonds and
put them in her box? A. No., not unless she came to
Logan with me and done it when I wasn't around. I may
have brought her to Logan, but I was never with her when
she made any of those bonds at all." R. 394.)
Then on page 14 of appellant's brief, counsel states
that the witnesses who were brothers and sisters of Wal-
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lace, all testified as to their mother's testamentary incapacity. We have pointed out previously that every one
of these witnesses also were parties to two cross petitions
(Proponent's Exs. "B and C)" to the lower court to admit
the will to probate, but asking that Melvin, be appointed
Administrator with will annexed. Condonation of this
conduct would amount to perpetrating a fraud on our
Courts, and again we stress the fact that the jury found
that there was no fraud, no undue influence in the execution of the will, and in view of these findings we submit
that they bar any possible holding to the effect that the
testatrix was of unsound mind at the date of execution of
the will.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The findings and fudgment of the court,
admitting the last will and testament of Emma G. Buttars,
deceased, to probate, nothwithstanding the verdict of the
fury, are supported by competent and uncontradicted
evidence.
There is direct, positive, and uncontradicted evidence
that on March 22, 1945, the decedent, Emma G. Buttars,
caused her last will and testament to be prepared by Attorney Newell G. Daines. (R. 35, 37.) On that occasion
she went to his office, alone and unassisted, and furnished
the information necessary to prepare the will. ( R. 39).
And upon completion thereof, and after it was read to her,
she subscribed her name to the will in the presence of
Attorney Daines and his stenographer Lois Schenk, and
at her request and in her presence and in the presence of
each other, they subscribed the will as attesting witnesses,
and she then and there declared to them that it was her
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last will and testament. ( R. 39, 59.) The will was then
left with Attorney Daines, from March 22, 1945, until after
her demise which occurred on July 1, 1952. And it was
not changed or modified in any respect.
In re Carr's will, 256 Pac. 580, the Supreme Court
of Oregon stated:
"In determining the mental capacity of the testator
at the time of making the will, great weight is to be
given to the testtmony of the subscribing witnesses.
They have the opportunity to observe the mental condition and all the surrounding circumstnces at the
time of the execution of the will."
As further proof of the fact that Emma G. Buttars,
was normal in all respects to and including the time she
had a heart attack in March, 1951, we desire to briefly
refer to the testimony of neighbors and friends, who frequently visited with Mrs. Buttars from the years 1940 to
1951.
Vivian Clark, a neighbor, ( R. 277) testified that ~1rs.
Buttars attended his parent's golden wedding. This was
in 1943. (R. 277). Mrs. Buttars was at the witness' home
.three times after 1944. Mrs. Buttars read the newspapers,
discussed current events ( R. 279), and he knew that ~Irs.
Buttars had been sick, but he noticed between 1944 and
1947 that she was very alert (R. 280.)
Donna Sparks, a neighbor (R. 281) testified: Q.
"Would you say that she was normal for her age? A. Well,
certainly. I only hope that I can say that I'm as nonnal
when I'm that age." ( R. 286.) This was at the time the
will was executed. ( R. 287.) Donna knew of a heart
spell, but this was in 1951. ( R. 289.)
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Dr. C. C. Randall ( R. 290) felt she was perfectly
competent, and that the only time he saw her when she
was not alert was in March, 1952. ( R. 295.) Prior to
March, 1952 her mind was always sound. ( R. 296.)
Annie Thompson ( R. 302) was her Relief Society
Teacher with whom Mrs. Buttars discussed religious lessons-thought she was always alert and enjoyed visiting
with her (R. 305.) In 1947 these were monthly visits
(306-7.)

J.

Byron Ravsten (R. 313) lived in Clarkston all his
life ( 44 years old) and was Bishop of Mrs. Buttars ward,
knew her all of the years in question, and noticed nothing
unusual, until shortly before her death. (R. 315.)
Horace Bowles, (R. 319) was a Watkins Products
dealer, and had been for twenty-seven years, and had
called on Mrs. Buttars about every four or five weeks for
17 years (R. 320.) He did not notice any mental incompetency in his business dealings with her (R. 322. ) "She
never failed to recognize me. She never failed to recognize
what I was there for." (R. 323,) and he had continued to
call on her tilll951. (R. 322.)
Sylvia Goodey ( R. 326) was another neighbor who
had lived in Clarkston all her life, and she noticed nothing
peculiar about Mrs. Buttars ( R. 327-8) as late as 1951.
Pearl Allen ( R. 339) owns and operates a ladies readyto-wear store in Logan, where Mrs. Buttars traded and had
known Mrs. Allen for 15 years as a customer ( R. 341) and
Mrs. Buttars traded there all the time, right up to the last
illness. ( R. 343.) A. "Well I find that Mrs. Buttars was
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always alert. She knew what she wanted and that was
it . . . That was true during all these years . . . As long as
she came into the store she was perfect." ( R. 342. )
This resume only includes, friends, neighbors, busiiness acquaintances, the Bishop, the Relief Society Teacher, and the Doctor. May we ask why it is that not one
of such people would say Mrs. Buttars was incompetent,
and we must assume that if any of the people of Clarkston
had thought she was incompetent the appellants would
have produced them. There was not one disinterested
witness who testified for appellants.
Herein we shall give a brief summary of the testimony
of each witness called on behalf of the contestants and
appellants, who will be referred to hereafter as appellants.
The entire mass of testimony rendered by these people
is so replete with evidence of the competency at the time
of making the will, that the verdict of the jury in answer
to the first interrogatory is impossible to understand.
For instance, note the three answers. (R. 16.) All
the answers are in the negative and it is perfectly conceivable that the jury felt the answer to the first one to
be in favor of respondent. Otherwise, how can the answers
to No. 2 and No. 3 be reconciled with that of No. 1? If, in
fact no such fraud or undue influence existed at time will
was exevuted, the mother must have acted on her own initiative in dictating the terms of the will. We will briefly
refer to the testimony of each witness produced by appel. lants to indicate the reasons back of the testimony and to
show that the only reason for the contest was a dissappointment in the terms of the will.
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As a preliminary thereto, however, we will state that
Dan Buttars was a deceased son of Emma G. Buttars, the
testatrix. In the will ( R. 5) the testatrix specially mentioned them, but because she had loaned money to her
son Dan, their father, which had not been repaid she felt
he had received a just proportion of her estate. It is
interesting to note at this point ( R. 37) that Mrs. Buttars
gave Attorney Newel G. Daines instrutcions about the
terms of her will, and there was no one present at the
time to help, or to guide her, and he drew the will
solely from her instructions. She had walked to the second .
story floor of the Cache Valley Bank Building - long
and arduous steps for a person claimed to be feeble in
mind and body. (R.38.)
I

Villa Bronson, granddaughter and a contestant, testified that Mrs. Buttars was not as mentally alert as she was
before her illness ( R. 63); and that she was not as keen as
she used to be; but here witness was talking about a time
two weeks before the death of testatrix, or seven years after
the will was made. Witness testified that on Easter, 1945,
two or three weeks after date of will, she visited her grandmother, and that she was keeping her own home, was a
good housekeeper, and that she kept house in a neat and
tidy manner; that testatrix had remembered the exact
number of Dan's children though some first names were
misspelled.
Ted Buttars, grandson and contestant, testified that
he had been on a mission for the Mormon Church for
some years (R. 85) and upon his return he was called into
the navy in 1944, and returned in 1946. ( R. 86. ) Her
memory probably wasn't as good as it was then ( R. 87.)
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It is very important to note Ted's testimony about his
grandmother, when comparing her in 1946 to that of 1940.
"She had been sick longer, and naturally she was older and
more feeble, and I introduced her to my wife and she told
me she was glad that we were married and so forth. But
there was no definite conversation on any one thing. Just
like natural acquaintances would talk about." Some complaint was made all through the testimony of these grandchildren that she sometimes failed to recognize them. Ted
testified that his grandmother had 44 or 45 living grandchildren, 78 living great grandchildren, or a total of 122
grand and great grandchildren ( R. 89,) and yet the fact
that Mrs. Buttars sometimes failed to recollect some of
their names and family connections, is given as a reason
for her failing memory. We submit this to be a preposterous ~contention, and we will later show in this summary
that not once did she ever fail to recognize her own immediate sons and daughters, and we call the further attention of the court that the will was made during war
time, when most younger people were engaged in much
travel about the world, and conditions were much unsettled to the minds of even the most astute people.
Ted believed his grandmother incompetent to make
a will because she was 80 years old ( R. 91,) but if Mrs.
Buttars actually went to Mr. Daines office, gave him the
information to make the will, without a memorandum, that
she was comparable to any person he had ever seen eighty
years of age. ( R. 92. )
Orner Buttars, grandson and contestant, testified that
he belived his Grandmother incompetent because - "I
believe if she had been sound and capable of making a
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will that involved as much property and all as her estate
did, I don't believe she would have left us out like she
did." ( R. 108.) This witness was not so much concerned
with mental capacity as he was at the disappointment he
and his brothers and sisters had experienced, because he
testified (R. 111-112.) "The reason we're in court contesting the will is that we don't think if she was sound in
her mind and able to dispose of her property, that she
would have cancelled off what little indebtedness she had
at one time with my father, and then in the next paragraph
in the will turn around and give the rest of ~m six or
eight thousand dollars apiece. Q. And that 's.,._reason you
don't think she was competent? A. That's right."
Wendell Buttars, grandson and contestant: This witness was in the military service between the dates of Febraury 20, 1941 and April 15, 1945. ( R. 120. ) He gave
as some of his reasons for his grandmother's incapacity
that she did not "break down" at his father's funeral some
weeks previously, and yet he would not contend that she
was insane. ( R. 124.) He stated that she always re.cognized the people who had been with her, and it was the
people who had been away three· or four years that confused her. (R. 127. )Then he was asked: Q. "I want
you to tell the jury one case, if you know of, when you
were there when she failed to recognize her sons and
daughters. A. No."
Maybell Griffiths, daughter: This is a very interesting
witness. She stated that when her Mother was sick in
1944 (we claim that this sickness was 1946 -later shown),
that there was not as great a difference as in the 1940 sickness. R. 236-7.) She was asked if her mother had a sound
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a~d disposing mind and memory, and she answered, "Well,

not to handle any amount of money." ( R. 244.) Then
she gave the reason ~hy she wants the jury to find her
mother incompetent to make a will. ( R. 251.) Q. "Isn't
it a fact that in that petition all you ask the court to do
is appoint your brother Melvin as administrator? That's
all you ask in that, isn't it? A. Well, that's fine." She
was.one of the petitioners to have her brother Melvin made
Administrator-will annexed, to the same will she now
questions. She wanted two things - that Melvin and not
Wallace be executor, and she wanted Dan's sons and
daughters to share in the estate. ( . 252-3. ) She wants
the will probated, and she knows that if Melvin could be
the executor of it, it "would be swell with her." ( R. 253.)
Margaret Jardine, daughter: She testified that her
mother accused people of taking things, laying them away
and that she did things "all older people do as they get
older." (R. 260.) She said her mother at no time after
1942 or 1943 had sufficient mentality to dispose of her property by will ( R. 282,) but then she said: Q. "And your
mother was simply a person normal for the age of eighty
years; isn't that right? A. Oh, usual. ( R. 264.) And
then became one of the signers to the petition which
prayed to admit her mother's will to probate, but to have
her brother Melvin administrator of the estate with will
annexed. (R. 264.) "Q. Do you know what you signed
when you siged this? A. Papers. Q. It was a petition,
wasn't it, and you wanted this court to probate your
mother's will, didn't you? A. ·Yes." (R. 265.)
Melvin H. Buttars, son of testatrix: This witness was
given a free rein to show his mother to be incompetent
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and said. ( R. 179. ) "Well as tim~ went on her memory
wasn't so good." He would not set a date when he felt his
mother was incompetent. ( R. 180.) He testified that his
mother was neither physically nor mentally able to make
a will between 1940 and 1952, the date of her death, yet
he did not know that she had made a will until 1950.
(R. 184.) And this witness filed two cross-petitions; in the
same proceedings, and same court, to have the same will
admitted to probate. ( R. 204. ) The following quotation
from the cross-examination will indicate to the court why
the lower court set aside the verdict of the jury: Q. (reading from the petition which the witness signed) "I'll read
it to him, 'Being of the age of abou~ eighty years and being
of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting
under duress or undue influence from any person or persons whosoever,. do make, publish, and declare this to be
my last will and testament.' Did you sign asking the court
to probate that will? A. I signed a petition asking to
probate it? Q. Yes. A. No, I didn't sign a petition asking
to probate it. Q. _I refer you to petitioners' prayer-and
one of them is you, right there-for letters testamentary.
Do you know what that means? A.. It means testifying, I
guess. . Q. 'And that said will be admitted to probate.'
That's exactly the one you're asking the jury now to deny
probate because your mother was in~ompetent. And that
letters be issued to you, Melvin. Am I right or wrong?
A. You're right. Q. You're positive I'm right, aren't you?
And you alleged it oil the theory your mother was competent at the time she made the will, didn't you? The substance of that is that you allege to this court and represented under oath sworn to before a notary public, Judge
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Harris, that your mother was competent at the time she
made that will, did you not? A. It's on there, yes."
(R. 205.)
This witness shows the extent that he will go to gain
his own ends, i.e. to have a jury determine his mother incompetent. "Q. This is the document (referring to the
petition this witness and two sisters signed) alleging to
this court your mother$ was ~ompetent to make a will, and
you presented it for probate. Examine it and see if I'm
correct. (Examines the petition to make him the Administrator with will annexed - same will.) A. I signed it,
yes, if that's what's in there .... Q. And y9u ask the court
that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with will annexed be issued to Melvin H.
Buttars (the witness,) and you thereupon represented to
this court that your mother was of· sound and disposing
mind on the day she made the will, did you not? A. Thafs
what's in them documents I signed." (R. 205-6.)
He testified that his mother did business after the
'
sickness of 1940 as she did before, and in fact right up to
her death. ( R. 222. ) He says: "As far as the signatures
and the checks being wrote out, yes. She signed all of her
checks up until the last while of her life." (R. 222.)
The ·character of the evidence of contestants is all the
same and on the other hand, Doctor Randall who attended
her for years, and all of the witnesses for proponent testified as to her mental ability. We remark with the Supreme Court. of California in the case of Dobrzensky's
Estate, 232 P. 2d. 886, that "While it is not determinative,
nevertheless it is remarkable that in this case no intimate
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acquaintance nor qualified physician, not even respondent,
saw fit to testify that in his or her opinion the decedent
lacked testamentary capacity. This case appears to be
another example of a jury finding a testator incompetent
because the jury did not like what was done" .... "It has
been held over and over in this state that old age, feebleness, forgetfulness, filthy personal habits, personal eccentricities, failure to recognize aid friends or relatives, physical disability, absentmindedness and mental confusion, {if
present only to a limited degree) do not furnish grounds
for holding that a testator lacked testamentary capacity.',
Our search for cases where juries have held the testator incompetent mentally, and the appellate courts either
reversed the verdict of the jury, or sustained the lower
court in setting aside the verdict of the jury, results in some
interesting cases outside of Utah. In Re Lingenfelter's
Estate (Cal.) 241 P. 2d. 990. There the facts were long
and witnesses testified that the testatrix was not of sufficient mental capacity to make a will, but based their opinion
on facts similar to those we have such as an unstable mind.
In our case some of the contestants had been away between 1940 and 1945 and 1946 as outlined above. The
California Court said:
"Accepting that construction of the evidence most
favorable to Lenore, it shows no lack of testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will presented for probate. There is testimony concerning
isolated acts, foibles, idiosyncracies, mental irregularities or departures from normal which do not bear
directly upon and influence the testamentary act. But
much more than that is required to set aside bequests
of property. The actual mental condition of the de-
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cedent at the time of the execution of the will is the
question to be determined upon a contest based on his
alleged incompetency, and evidence tending to show
unsoundness of mind either before or after the execution of the will is important only in so far as it tends
to show mental condition at the time of the execution
of the will . . . . To overcome the presumption of sanity, the contestant must show affirmatively and by a
preponderance of the evidence that the testator was
of unsound mind at the time he executed his will ....
The acts which led certain witnesses to express the
. opinion that she was of unsound mind had no bearing
upon her testimentary capacity. (Italics supplied.)
As in our case the California will was attacked because
of an unnatural disposition of property, or disposition
which ,contestants. claimed testatrix would not have made
had she been of sound mind, noting further:
But, when mental incapacity is the ground of attack,
the dispository clauses of the will are not, in and of
themselves, . evidence of mental incapacity which
would overcome the presumption of sanity and competence."
The Arizona case of In Re Greene's Estate, 11 P. 2d.
947, is a very enlighte~.ing and important case where the
issues were incompetence and undue influence. The action
to deny probate of the will was entered by the wife, and
several witnesses testifed that the testator was incompetent. The trial court found the testator incompetent, but
made no finding as to undue influence. In our case n1uch
stress is placed on the fact that the family of Mrs. Buttars
considered the appointment of a guardian. Such was the
consideration in the Arizona case:
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"From the date of the an1putation onward during
the months of February and March, testator was delerous at times and admittedly during that period had
various mental delusions. On the other hand, during
most of that tin1e he was apparently perfectly normal
mentally. The strain of caring for him was great, both
physically and financially, and his family and friends
seriously considered attempt,ing to have him committed to the state hospital for the insane, but, as he improved, abandoned the idea.,, (Italics supplied.)
It will be recalled that Mrs. Allen, a Logan store
owner transacted business with Mrs. Buttars almost up to
the time of her death in 1952, seven years after the will.
And the bank statements, both savings and checking, disclosed that Mrs. Buttars was managing her property and
depositing the income in the bank to and including the
year 1951, or within approximately six months of her
demise. The Arizona case had this to say:
"On the contrary, it (evidence) is overwhelming
to the effect that except during certain times in the
months of January, February and March, when he was
suffering great pain and worried over his physcial
condition, his mental capacity was good. He transacted considerable general business during and after
this period, and the persons who did business with
him stated that he displayed a full understanding of
what he was doing. Even the witnesses for appellee
admitted that most of the time he appeared perfectly
competent. They based their testimony that in their
belief he was not mentally competent to make a will
principally on the fact that he unquestionably suffered
from certain delusions during- and shortly after his
confinement to his bed .... The rule is that even
though a testator does suffer from delusions or halluci-
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nations unless the will itself was a creature or product
of such delusions or hallucinations it is not invalid."
Contestants in case at bar make much of the matter
concerning the fact of whether or not testatrix mistakenlv
thought her deceased son Dan owed her money. On ibis
point, the Arizona case said:
"The testator may have been mistaken in the conclusions which he drew from his wife's conduct; but
those conclusions were not so unwarranted, especially
in view of the fact that the property in question was
all accumulated by him before the marriage, that we
can say that they show he was mentally incompetent
to make a ·will. Nor is a court concerned with the
abstract justice or injustice of a will." (Italics sup·
plied.)·
In the Colorado case of In Re Holmes' Estate, 56
P. 2d. 1333, the court held that where the testator mistakenly believed that hfs sister was dead and therefore,
made no provision for her, 'Yas not sufficient to invalidate
the will. The court reversed the lower court because it
was a jury question as to whether the belief of the demise
of- testator's sister was ·induced by fraud or other beneficiaries. Sane people are continually in the courts under the
mistaken belief that others owe them money, and a verdict
for defendant in such cases is no indication that the plaintiff is insane. We ask counsel for contestants to cite a
case, where the mistaken belief was not induced by fraud
sustaining his· position in this respect.
A very important -case is found from California in Re
Smethurst's Estate,
2d. 830. The procedural matters
were exactly like this appeal. In the California case, the
jury found that the testator was insane at the time of the

UP.
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execution of the \vill, and the lower court entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court
after a revie\v of the evidence saying:
"If the motion for a directed verdict is made at the
conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court cannot, of
course, go beyond the evidence then before the court,
but if the motion is made at the close of defendant's
case, the court can review the entire record within the
limitations imposed by law'' . . . . "Also there need
not be and absence of conflict in the evidence, for, to
deprive the court of the right to exercis,e this power,
there must be a substanial conflict, and that presupposes at least a comparison of the substance of the
conflicting testimony of contestants and proponents."
( Italicts supplied.)
In that case some of the witnesses considered and
testified to the fact that testator was. insane at all times:
"It was testified he frequently drank to excess, and
several of the witnesses testified they considered him
insane. A few considered him insane at all times, but
most of them considered him insane only when drinking, and when not under the influence of liquor they
declared their opinion to be· he was sane. The conception of most of these witnesses as to what constituted insanity was vague and uncertain."
Upon the authority of that case we desire to direct
the attention of the court to the fact, as pointed out in our
review of contestant's testimony, that the witness Orner
Buttars, testified his grandmother, Mrs. Buttars, was inco~petent because she did riot make provision for the
children
·of Dan Buttars.
.
.
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In re Putnam's Estate, (Cal.) 34 P. 2d. 148:
In the matter of the estate of Adam Putnam, deceased,
will contest by his son W. M. Putnam, opposed by the
Wells Fargo Bank, etc. and other proponents. From a
judgment for contestant entered on jury's verdict and from
an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, proponents appealed.
The evidence disclosed that he left an estate of about
$300,000. He devised and bequeathed to his executor, in
trust, his entire estate. He was divorced from his wife,
and left surviving daughter Edna, and a son W. M. Putnam, to whom he left monthly bequests of $500.00, and
$250.00, respectively. His son filed an opposition to probate of his will. The testator died at the age of 82. It was
charged that he used intoxicating liquor daily during the
latter 40 years of his life which resulted in his insanity, and
that because of liquors, testator had become so weakened
in his physical and mental powers that he was incapable of
testamentary act. The jury found that decedent was not of
sound and disposing mind when the will and codicil were
executed. The proponents moved for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict which was denied. A motion for new
trial was denied.
Upon appeal the judgment of trial court was reversed.
In stating the contention of the contestant, the appellate
court said:
"The contestant insists that the testator was possessed of an insane delusion which he described as an
unexplained, intense, and unwarranted hatred and
hositilty toward his wife and her blood relatives, par-
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ticularly the contestant; and unfounded and fixed belief that his children were worthless and inco1npetent;
that they had "too n1uch Johnston, and that they had
no Putnam blood in them; an unfounded and fixed
belief that whoever might marry his children had designs only on the testator's property and were awaiting
his death to get hold of it; an unwarranted, unfounded, and fixed belief that his children were
spendthrifts and would dissipate and squander his
estate within three years after his death and become
public charges.''
In conclud•ing that the testator possessed testmentary capacity to make the will in question, it held:
"The only reasonable conclusion from the record
before us is that the testator was possessed of a parental belief, not abnormal or unfounded under the
facts, relating to his son's ability to handle money, and
that he took steps to protect him with an income adequate to his needs in addition to his own earnings for
the balance of his life. Even though there may have
been discard in the family during the decedent's lifetime or even injustice in the division of income between the children, that alone would not be sufficient
to set aside a will executed by one in full possession
of his mental faculties and otherwise competent to
make a will."
In the Montana case of In re Benson's Estate, 98 P.2d.
868, the undisputed evidence discloses that Benson was
taken to hospital on Wednesday, February 2, 1938, suffering from diabetes mellitus and left lobar pneumonia, from
which illness he died at 8:45 a. m., Sunday, February 6,
1938. At time of his death he was 71 years of age. At his
request a will was prepared on Sat:urday evening, February
5th about 12 hours prior to his death. When his will was
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offered for probate, the executor named therein submitted
proof in support of the allegations of his petition. Contest
having theretofore been filed, the case was tried before
the court and a jury. The trial and result thereof is stated
in the opinion:
"A jury having been impaneled, the contestants
submitted evidence in support of their contest, and at
the conclusion of all evidence the court submitted a
single interrogatory to the jury, as follows: Was John
A. Benson competent to make a last will and testament
at the time of the alleged signing of the instrument
offered for probate as a will dated February 5, 1938?,
The jury answered the interrogatory in the negative,
and thereupgn the· judgment aforesaid was entered."
In reversing the judgment of trial court, the Supreme
Court called attention to a fundamental rule, viz:"We must bear in mind that, in the solution of the
question here presented, one who contests a will has
the burden of proof once the allegations of the petition for probate have been sufficiently proven. In
re Murphy's Estate, 43 Mont. 353, 116 P. 1004, Ann.
Cas. 1912C, 389. Also that a testator may dispose of
his property as he sees fit, and that courts cannot make
wills fpr persons. In re Silver's Estate, 98 Mont. 141,
38 P. 2d. 277." (Italics supplied.)
And the following observation made by the Montana
Court is applicable to the situation present when Mrs.
Buttars executed her will:
"It appears to us that the physical facts surroundi.ng
the execution of the will and the acts of the testator
speak louder than the witnesses in supporting the proponent's contention that the testator was competent.
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Viewed in the light of the foregoing instructions, and ·
from the evidence offered, it is clear that there is no
question of incompetency by reason of insanity, or
senility, or disease prior to the time testator was taken
to the hospital, and that at the time of the execution
of the will he had in mind the names of the objects
of his bounty, and also the character of his property,
and the manner 4! -which he desired to dispose of it."
In the case Klose et. al. vs. Collins et. al., 20 P.2d. 494,
the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed judgment in favor
of defendants. On appeal, contestants assigned two principal errors, viz - "The findings and judgment of the court
is contrary to the law and evidence," and "The court erred
in sustaining defendants demurrer to the evidence."
The grounds upon which plaintiffs seek to set aside
the will are mental incompetancy of testatrix, undue influence, and want of independent advice:"
The testatrix, Hattie Weary, executed a will on August
4, 1931, at the age of 78. She died on December 1, 1931.
For several years prior to her death she had been a \Vidow,
and she had no near relatives. The contestant's were children of half brothers and half sisters, who resided in New
York and Pennsylvania. The defendants are Arthur J.
Collins and· Glen R. Sewell. They were president and
cashier, respectively, of the National Bank of -Sebetha,
where she resided, and who had been friendly and helpful
to her in the management of her affairs. They were appointed joint executors by her will. The contestants offered evidence to show that she had relied entirely upon
the defendants in her business and personal transactions,
since the death of her husband some seven years prior to
her demise.
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The trial,court held that the evidence of plaintiffs was
not sufficient to prove mental incompetency of testatrix
or that undue influnence or fraud had been exercised upon
her.
In affirming judgment of lower court, the Supreme
Court of Kansas referred to a well known rule which is
followed in evaluating the evidence in a will contest:
"In order to possess the mental capacity to make a
valid will the law, based upon the experience of man·kind and common sense, does not require that the
testator possess the ability to manage or carry on a
c'omplicated business · enterprise. If necessary the
mental capacity to know what property he has, and is
able to make a disposition of his property with understanding reason, knows the persons and objects of his
bounty, and their condition and relationship to himself, and is ·able to dictate the items of the will himself, this is sufficient.' Higbee v. Bloom, 108 Kan.
723 733, 196 P. 1080, 1084."
The court also called attention to another well known
rule:
" 'The settled rule in this state is that one who is able
to understand what property he has and how he wants
it to go at his· death, is competent to make a will even
though& he may be feeble in mind and descrepit in
body.' Cole v. Drum, 109 Kan. 148, syl. par. 6, 197
P. 1105, 1106. See also, Risel v. McPhersol) County,
122 Kan. 741, 253 P. 586; Hoff v. Hoff, 106 Kan. 542,
189 P. 613; and Wisner v. Chandler, 95 Kan. 36, 147
P. 849."
In weighing the evidence the court said:
"There is no evidence here to indicate that the business relationship these two defendants had with the
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testatrix ever reached the state of being such as might
properly be termed confidential, nor the influence
they may have had with her or over her being unduly
used, in the making of the will or in other matters."
And then the court concluded:
"We conclude that the showing of mental incapacity was not sufficient under all the facts and circumstances to require the setting aside of the will on that
account."
It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court
of Oregon in a recent case, In re Scott"s Estate, 228 P.2d.
417, laid down a salutary rule:
"The last will and testament of a deceased persqn
is an instrument of such great solemnity; that it will
never be set aside unless the evidence is convincing
that it should be."
In re Peterknis Estate (Cal. ) 73 P2d. 897, the facts
are stated as follows:
"Under his will, dated May 12, 1931, with an holographic codicil dated September 23, 1933, he left his
property to a sister, a cousin, seven nephe~s, five
nieces, and four children of nephews and nieces. The
will and codicil were admitted to probate on December 6, 1935. A petition to revoke the proba~e of said
will was filed by the three sons and three daughters
of the deceased upon the ground that on May 12,
1931, and for at least a year before and at all times
subsequent thereto he was of unsound mind and incompetent to make a will, and upon the further
ground that throughout said time he was in declining
health and in an enfeebled mental condition; that he
was suffering from delusions that his said children
did not care for him, that they wanted him to die in
order to get his property, that they were conspiring
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to make his home. life unhappy, and that they were
unfairly siding with their mother in the domestic differ~nces which had arisen; that said delusions grew
until they became a monomania which existed at the
time of the signing of said will and codicil and up to
the time of his death; and that said delusions were
the controlling mental factors governing the making
of said will and codicil."
The trial was had before a court and jury. At the
conclusion of contestants evidence, a motion for non-suit
was granted. The Supreme Court posed the familiar rule:
"Under familiar rules the question presented is
whether, viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, was there any substantial evidence which would
have supported a judgment in their favor."
The evidence which is related in the opinion covers
misconduct of the testator, in his relationship with his
children whom he disinherited. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The following well known rules were relied upon .in the determination of mental competancy sufficient to make a valid
will:
" 'The law is( well settled in this state that a 'testator is of sound and disposing mind and memory, if, at
the t~e of making his will he has sufficient mental
capacity to be able to understand the nature of the
act he is doing, and to understand and recall the
nature and situation of his property, and to remember
and understand his relations to the persons who have
claims upon his bounty, and whose interests are affected by the provisions of the instrument.' " Estate
of Bemmerly, 110 Cal. A pp. 550, 294, P. 33, 37."
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The court also relied upon the following rule:
" 'Every mental departure from the normal will not
destroy a testamentary disposition, otherwise valid,
of the testatrix's estate." " 'Mental derangement sufficient to invalidate a will must be insanity in one of
t\VO forms: ( 1 ) Insanity of such broad character as
to establish mental incompetency generally; or. ( 2)
some specific and narrower form of insanity under
which the testator is the victim of some hallucination
or delusion' ''
The Court did not approve of testator's conduct, but
nevertheless held such conduct was not evidence of incompetency. We quote from the opinion:
''While the evidence indicates that the testator possessed many qualities which are not admirable, it is
far from sufficient to show general mental ~com
petency at the time the will was made or that he did
not then have sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing and to understand and recall
the nature and situation of his property and his relations to the persons who had a natural claim on his
bounty."
In our search for Utah cases, not cited by appellant,
where this court has passed upon the question of mental
incompetency of a testator or testatrix, we find In re
Bryan's Estate, 25 P.2d. 602, and In re LaVelle's Estate,
248 P.2d. 372 ..
The facts in the Bryan Estate case show that Bryan
died at Ogden, August 15, 1929. His will was made on
August 6, while he was confined in the hospital and immediately after a major operation had been performed.
He left as his property a bank account of about $8,000.00,
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which he bequeathed to the St. Joseph's School at Ogden.
He disinherited an only surviving sister Bertha M. Clinch,
who resided in the state of Nebraska, and she filed a contest, in which she alleged mental incompetancy and undue
influence.
The contest was heard before the court, without a
jury. At the conclusion of the contestant's case, proponent
.moved for judgment of non-suit, which motion was granted
and upon appeal judgment was affirmed.
Although the evidence showed that decedent was a
verv
sick man when he executed the will, the doctor testi"'
fied that his mind was sound and that he could make a will.
And the trial court and this court so held. We submit that
the following excerpt taken from the opinion is in point on
the issue of mental competancy and burden of proof:
"In the instant case- the burden of proof was on
contestant to show mental incapacity and undue influence, and the proponent of the will could meet this
by proof of a negative, that is, that he did not procure the execution of the will by undue influence, and
that the testator was not mentally incapable."
In a recent decision rendered by this court in re LaVelle's Estate, 248 P.2d. 372, an interesting question is
raised which is present in the case at bar. In that case
testatrix lived for more than a year after the will was
executed, and in the case at bar Mrs. Buttars lived seven
years and three months. In considering the claim of contestants that Lucille LaVelie was incompetent at tin1e she
executed her will, this court said:
"There is another aspect of the case which is
strongly persuasive that this third testament repre-
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sented the will of Lucille Lavelle: It is indisputable
that after its execution she lived for a vear: about six
months in Odgen and about six n1onths in the Holladay rest home; during this time she had communication with others but made no effort to revoke the will
or to make another. There is no evidence and no
finding that she was incompetent at any time after
the will's execution; and no reason appears why she
did not have ample opportunity to change it if it had
not conformed to her desires. As a matter of fact,
there is no indication that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction with it."
The evidence in case at bar discloses that Mrs. Buttars
actively kept account of her income from the property,
real and personal, after executing her will. The bank
statements show that she deposited large sums of money
each year. She renewed a lease in 1948. During the
seven yea~s and three months the Buttars will remained
in Attorney Daines office, so Mrs. Buttars had ample opportunity during that period, to make a new will or change
the will, she made in March 22, 1945. Yes, Mrs. Buttars
had ample opportunity to change the will, and as was
stated by this court in the LaVelle decision - "there is no
indication that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction with
it."

Point 11. The sole point raised by appellants on this
appeal is that the verdict of the jury was supported by
substantial competent evidence, and all legitimate inferences deducible therefrom, of lack of testamentary capacity on the part of the deceased at the time of the execution
of the will in question and because thereof the lower court
usurped the function of the jury in rendering judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
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In support of his contention counsel cites and relies
upon In re Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d. 432, and In re
Dong Ling Hing's Estate, 2 P .2d. 902, to the effect that a
will contest is an action at law, and hence the court cannot
weigh and pass upon conflicting evidence, or pass on the
credibility of witnesses.
·
There was no conflict in the evidence In re Alexander's Estate, supra. The evidence showed without dispute"that the will was not signed by the testatrix in the presence of one of the subscribing witnesses." The witness
testified - "No. I was not present when she signed it," and
"I did not see her sign it." On that testimony, which was
not in conflict, the court refused to admit the will to probate. The undisputed facts in the Alexander Estate, supra,
cannot be compared with the undisputed evidence in the
case at bar, since in the case at bar both subscribing witnesses appeared in court and testified that Mrs. Buttars,
signed the will in their presence and at her request and
in her presence and in the presence of each other, they
subscribed their names to said will as witnesses, in fact,
their testimony showed that all of the statutory requirements in the execution of the will were complied with.
In re Dong Ling Hing's Estate, 2 P .2d. 902, as stated
in the opinion - "The ~chief issue before the court is the
validity of the purported will, whether it was duly and
lawfully executed and published by deceased, and duly
attested by the subscribing witnesses." It appeared from
the evidence adduced at the trial in that case, as reported
in the opinion, that one of the subscribing witnesses when
shown the purported will some time prior to the trial said-
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"I didn't sign it." "No, that is not my signature." And
when the other subscribing witness was contacted and he
examined the purported will he likewise denied that he
signed the document in question as a will, and that he did
not sign it in the presence of the testator or the other
witness. (2P.2d. 907 - 1st Column.) This testimony
seemed to be undisputed.
The case of Galorowidz v. Ward, et al. 230 P.2d. 576 is
cited by appellant in an attempt to show that the instant
action, being one at law, the court cannot weigh and pass
upon conflicting evidence. That case did not involve a will
contest but a suit for damages resulting from an automobile
accident. Galorowidz sued Robert Ward, a minor, his parents John M. Ward, and Mrs. John M. Ward, Max Siegel,
and others. At the time of the accident Robert Ward was
operating a car, the property of Seigel, who was the employer of John M. Ward. There was no dispute in the
evidence relative to ownership of the car. It was conceded that Robert Ward, was at the time of the accident
operating a car belonging to Siegel, but he was not Siegel's
employee. Thus there was no conflicting evidence in that
case on question of agency.
Since the contestant's did not call a physician to testify
concerning Mrs. Buttars condition of health at the time the
will was executed, there is an attempt on the part of appellants counsel to discredit the testimony of Dr. C. C.
Randall, who testified that he had been her attending
physician from the year 1934 to the time of her death
which occurred on July 1st, 1952. He testified that with
the exception of two occasions, the first in 1940, when she
was confined i!l the hospital suffering from pneumonia,
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and again in the year 1946, when she was again taken to
the hospital for a short period suffering from a similar
cause, her mental condition was normal for a woman of her
age to and including March 1st, 1952. ( R. 291-296.) Dr.
Randall testified that her health and mental condition was
normal during the year 1945, when she executed her will.
(R. 260.)
.
On page nine of brief, appellant's counsel propounds
the query? "Was the jury's verdict that the deceased
lacked testamentary capacity at. time will was executed,
supported by substantial competent evidence?" The answer is definitely - No. Their verdict is contrary to the
testimony of the two subscribing witnesses who testified
that decedent furnished the information for the will, gave
them the names of her children, and grandchildren, and
stated why she desired to limit the childrent of Dan Buttars, a deceased son to $1.00 each. They testified that she
declared it to be her last will and she signed it in their
presences and they signed as attesting witnesses at her
request, and in her presence and in the presence of each
other. And the evidence shows that she took an active
part in the management of her farm property each year
after the date of will, until about March 1, 1952.
Counsel has cited the case In re Swan's Estate, 51
Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, and contends that the Swan case is
distinguishable from the case at bar. As a matter of fact
the two cases are very similar in one or more important
points, as the following review of the evidence in that case
will show: Mr. Swan was a businessman of considerable
wealth. He was 83 years of age when his will was executed. He was then suffering and, for a number of :·cars
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had been suffering from hardening of the arteries and with
some disease of the kidneys, and at times he had spells of
unsciousness lasting several hours at a time; that these
spells occurred about a month apart, and at times oftener.
That when the spells were over his mind was usually clear.
That he continued to transact business such as collecting
his rents, and depositing the money in the bank. Mr.
Swan wrote the terms of the will in long hand and then
had it typed in proper form. He then signed the will in
the presence of two of his business associates.
~1r.

Swan intentionlly omitted Maude A. Blackford,
a granddaughter from his will because he had previously
given her all the property he intended to bestow upon her.
She filed objections to the admission of said will to probate. She alleged that at the time will was executed, Swan
was not of sound and disposing mind. That he was unduly
influenced and was prejudiced against her. That the will
was procured by fraud, circumvention and undue influence, practiced upon the deceased by his son Ulysses G.
Swan, or someone in his behalf. That the will was not
executed in the manner and form required by law. At
trial contestant contended that when Swan executed the
will he was suffering from senile dementia and for that and
other reasons the will cannot be permitted to stand.
The Swan will was attested by two of _his friends.
Both witnesses testified to the execution of the will. The
court said that their testimony constitutes a prima facie
case in favor of the testators mental capacity, and his will
was admitted to probate and, on appeal the judgment of
trial court was affirmed. It is respectfully submitted that
the decision in the Swan case supports the trial courts
decision in case at bar.
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To support his contention that non-expert witness.es
are competent in cases of this kind, he cites In re McCoy's
Estate, (Utah) 63 P.2d. 622; In re Hansen's Estate, 52
P.2d. 1103 and In re Swan's Estate. Respondent has no
quarrel with the contention that non-expert witnesses are
competent in cases of this kind, in fact in the instant case
proponent's called ten such witnesses.
However, the decision rendered by this court in re
McCoy's Estate supra, is based upon defects appearing in
the execution of the will. The facts in that case reveal that
Mrs. McCoy was 92 years of age, was in a very weak and
feeble condition when certain of her relatives attempted
to have her execute a will. There was a serious question
whether she would have executed a will had she been in
normal state of health. And moreover, the trial court
found, based upon the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to her purported will, that they did not sign it at
her request, but signed it at the request of Attorney
Cooper, who prepared the will. The evidence in that
case disclosed that Mrs. McCoy was in a very sick and
weakened condition, and was not conscious of the fact that
a will was being made. She passed away one week after
the purported will was made.
In re Hansen's ·Estate, 52 P.2d. 1103, trial was had
before. the court. The trial court found for the protestant,
and concluded that proponent had procured the instntment wholly by pursuasion, inducement, fraud, and undue
influence; found the purported will null and void, and
refused to admit the same to probate. The evidence disclosed that the testatrix was a cripple, resulting fron1
spinal meningitis. That she was abnormal in her actions,
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conduct, and outlook on life. The proponent of the will
prepared it and induced her to sign it in his apartment, at
night. The witnesses which he selected were not acquainted with the testatrix. Although the testatrix's mental and physical condition was extremely abnormal and
weak, the court said; "The answer he gave that she was
not normal does not necessarily imply that she was incompetent to make a will. In that case, the court found that
fraud, undue influence and duress · had been practi~ed
upon Miss Hansen. In the case at bar the jury found that
no fraud, duress or undue influence had been practiced
upon Mrs. Buttars.
Counsel contends, page 20 of appellants' brief, that
Mrs. Buttars was incompetent because subsequently to
the execution of the will, she transferred a portion of her
real property and some stocks, and purchased some war
bonds in the names of Wallace, Archulius and Hattie, the
three younger children, when the will provided that she
would give the nine living childrent equal shares.
The will did not describe any property and of course
could effect only the property, real and personal, owned
by Mrs. Buttars at the time of her demise, which was conservatively valued at.slightly under $40,000.00 ( R. 1-6.)

I

The fact that she retained a life estate in the deeds to
Wallace and Archulius, from which she received one-half
of crops grown on said lands until her demis~, indicates
that she possessed keen business a·cumen. And as a result
of this provision the income which she had enjoyed prior
to date of these deeds was not diminished but remaince,l
intact, and accounted in part, for the large bank accounts
which she left at her demise. ( R. 2.)
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From appellants' attitude as reflected in the latter
portion of their brief, the re~der would be led to believe,
that because Mrs. Buttars had made a will, that she would
thereafter be estopped from disposing of some of her property. Counsel in referring to the aforementioned deeds
etc., called it an unnatural disposition of her property. But
he does not refer the reader to any statute or case which
provides or holds that a person can not freely and voluntarily dispose of his or her property. But she had a reason
for her action viz., that she wanted to give the three
younger children this property to equalize the value of
property which she and her husband had given to the
older children prior to their father's demise. (R. 384.)
It is submitted that the matter mentioned by counsel
from pages 17 to conclusion of brief are immaterial. The
law afforded to testatrix the right to make exceptions in
her will. She explained her reason for limiting her deceased son's children to $1.00 each. No doubt she reasoned that inasmuch as her deceased son Dan had not
paid his debt to her, his estate would be enhanced to that
extent, and his children would receive that increase.
l\'or the foregoing reason proponent and respondent
respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed, with cost.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. NELSON
GEORGE D. PRESTON
Attorneys for Proponent
and Respondent.
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